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Does the human mind resemble the machines that can behave like it? Biologically inspired machine-
learning systems approach “human-level” accuracy in an astounding variety of domains, and even predict
human brain activity—raising the exciting possibility that such systems represent the world like we do.
However, even seemingly intelligent machines fail in strange and “unhumanlike” ways, threatening their
status as models of our minds. How can we know when human–machine behavioral differences reflect
deep disparities in their underlying capacities, vs. when such failures are only superficial or peripheral? This
article draws on a foundational insight from cognitive science—the distinction between performance and
competence—to encourage “species-fair” comparisons between humans and machines. The performance/
competence distinction urges us to consider whether the failure of a system to behave as ideally hypoth-
esized, or the failure of one creature to behave like another, arises not because the system lacks the
relevant knowledge or internal capacities (“competence”), but instead because of superficial constraints
on demonstrating that knowledge (“performance”). I argue that this distinction has been neglected by
research comparing human and machine behavior, and that it should be essential to any such comparison.
Focusing on the domain of image classification, I identify three factors contributing to the species-fairness
of human–machine comparisons, extracted from recent work that equates such constraints. Species-fair
comparisons level the playing field between natural and artificial intelligence, so that we can separate
more superficial differences from those that may be deep and enduring.
artificial intelligence | deep learning | perception | cognition | development
Intelligent machines now rival humans on a stunning
array of tasks: They can recognize images of objects
and faces, answer questions posed in natural lan-
guage, make strategic decisions under risk and un-
certainty, and perform other cognitive feats once
thought out of reach for artificial intelligence (AI) (ref. 1
and Fig. 1A). These advances support technologies such
as automated radiology, machine translation, autono-
mous vehicles, and more (refs. 2–4; though see refs. 5
and 6). But beyond such practical purposes, machine-
learning successes have also been exciting for re-
searchers studying the human mind and brain. Recent
work, for example, suggests that intermediate layers of
certain artificial neural networks (ANNs) resemble known
processing stages in human vision (7–9) and that such
models can predict the behavior (10–12) and neural pro-
cessing of humans and other primates, from large-scale
activation of brain regions to the firing patterns of indi-
vidual neurons (13–19).*
What’s at Stake
This unprecedented success raises an exciting possi-
bility: that such systems not only solve the engineering
challenges they were designed for, but also mean-
ingfully reproduce aspects of human perception and
cognition—a kind of “model organism” for people (20).
For example, artificial neural networks—especially those
branded as deep neural networks (DNNs)—are now said
to have “significant representational similarities to hu-
man brains” (7), to potentially “explain many aspects of
human cognition” (21), and even to “carve the brain at its
joints” (22); see also refs. 12, 23, and 24.
Claims like these are exciting not only for their the-
oretical significance in cognitive science, engineering,
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and philosophy (25–27), but also for opening new avenues for
scientific discovery. For example, this possibility could enable a
“virtual electrophysiology” (17) in which machines participate in
“experiments” that would be unethical or resource intensive in
humans—e.g., recording how machine “neurons” respond to ex-
perimental stimuli. So too for a virtual neuropsychology exploring
“lesions” to machine “brains,” or a virtual psychophysics that collects
behavioral responses on massive stimulus sets. Although an age of
purely virtual neuroscience lies well into the future (if it lies anywhere at
all), seeds of this research are planted already (18, 19, 28–30).
Perspective: Distinguish “Performance” from
“Competence”
Nearly all of the psychological and neuroscientific promise of
these advances rests on a kind of similarity between cognitive
processing in humans and the corresponding processes in can-
didate machine-learning systems. How should we evaluate such
similarity? Although this question has a long history, here I aim to
shed a new kind of light on it. Both classical and contemporary
discussions of such issues tend to focus on machine-learning
“successes”—e.g., asking what amazing feat a machine must
perform in order to be relevantly humanlike (31–33). By contrast,
here I focus on interpreting machine “failures”: asking how differ-
ently a machine must behave from humans in order to be sufficiently
unhumanlike. Even the most sophisticated machine-learning sys-
tems can commit surprisingly odd and alarming errors in perceiving
and acting on the world around them (Fig. 1B). These strange be-
haviors pose challenges for incorporating such technologies into our
lives (34); but they also threaten the theoretical excitement about
humanlike processing in machines, suggesting that glimpses of
humanlike success elsewhere must have unhumanlike origins after
all (26, 35–38).
However, I suggest that behavioral differences between humans
and machines—including even spectacular machine failures—
are not always what they seem, and that they must be interpreted
in light of the different constraints that humans and machines in-
evitably face (including differences in hardware, speed, task pre-
sentation, response modes, and more). In particular, I argue that
evaluations of human–machine similarity are unlikely to succeed
without incorporating a foundational insight from developmental
psychology and psycholinguistics: distinguishing the observed
“performance” of a system from its underlying “competence”
(39). Drawing on this distinction, I review an emerging literature
comparing human and machine behavior—primarily in the do-
main of image classification—to extract three principles of “fair”
human–machine comparisons, and cast these principles into
guidelines for future tests: 1) placing human-like constraints on
machines, 2) placing machine-like constraints on humans, and
3) “species-specific” task alignment. In each case, I show how
adopting these principles has concretely revised earlier thinking
about human–machine behavioral differences, and I point to fur-
ther differences that might be similarly illuminated. Finally, I dis-
cuss a challenge problem where machine failures go beyondmere
performance constraints. Together, these cases show how dis-
tinguishing performance from competence can separate more
superficial human–machine differences from those that may be
deep and enduring.†
The Problem of “Machine Failures”
When machines behave in ways that resemble human perfor-
mance, they are often described as humanlike or brainlike (43–45).
Such claims are especially strong in the domain of visual pro-
cessing (the primary focus of this paper), where ANNs of various
flavors are claimed to “capture the essential characteristics of
biological object recognition” (p. 1 in ref. 46) and serve as “the
best current model of high-level visual areas in the brain” (p. 1 in
ref. 47).
However, a powerful reason to doubt such resemblance arises
when the same systems “fail” in ways that humans do not. Such
failures pervade many domains of artificial intelligence research
(both within and outside the Deep Learning umbrella): Robots that
walk with strikingly humanlike gaits may collapse spectacularly if
they must also twist a doorknob or hold a box (48); question-
answering systems that defeat world-class human trivia players
make errors that elementary students might catch [e.g., placing
Toronto in America (49)]; machines that easily solve college-level
math problems can fail on questions from kindergarten (e.g.,
1+1+1+1+1+1+1=?; ref. 50); and in perhaps the most striking
class of such failures, machines may be vulnerable to adversarial
attacks wherein they embarrassingly misclassify the stimuli around
them (Fig. 1B).
Adversarial examples are inputs that “fool” machines into
giving strange and inappropriate classifications of images,
speech, or text (51). For example, carefully crafted noise images
that otherwise look like meaningless visual patterns may be
Crossword Puzzle Armadillo Power Drill
Snowplow Chainlink Fence Elephant
A
B
Golf Ball
Jaguar
Fig. 1. (A) Machine-learning systems approach (and sometimes
surpass) “human-level” benchmarks on a wide array of tasks, especially
those involving visual recognition—e.g., identifying traffic signs,
recognizing objects and reading text. (B) But they also “fail” on
carefully chosen inputs that cause bizarre misclassifications. What do
such behaviors imply about human–machine similarity?
†Importantly, the question of humanlike processing in machines is distinct from
whether such systems are truly “intelligent” or “minded” in some deeper sense
(27, 33, 40), which can be asked independently of their similarity to humans. It
also differs from the engineering goal of actually building such machines (26),
which is separable from evaluation. Although all such questions may benefit
from contact with cognitive science, my focus here is on comparing cognitive
processes in humans to analogous processes in machine-learning systems, es-
pecially as such processes manifest in the “output behavior” of such systems.
Indeed, throughout this discussion, I’ll speak generally of “human–machine
similarity” (or dissimilarity), since the factors I consider are intended to gener-
alize beyond any one case study (e.g., image classification by people vs. by
AlexNet) to other architectures, training regimes, and tasks.
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classified as a “crossword puzzle” or “armadillo” (52). Similarly,
ordinary images that would normally be classified accurately can be
slightly perturbed to completely change machine classifications—
e.g., from “orange” to “power drill” (53) or “daisy” to “jaguar” (54).
ANNs may also diverge from humans on images with conflicting
cues, as when a cat’s shape is rendered in the texture of elephant
skin; many ANNs say “elephant”, whereas humans know not to (55,
56). Machines can even be fooled by natural images depicting
unusual scenarios or views, such as an overturned school bus on a
wintry road (classification: “snowplow”), or a honeycomb-patterned
umbrella (classification: “chainlink fence”) (57).
What Do Human–Machine Differences Mean? Machine failures
don’t just differ from ordinary human behaviors; they seem com-
pletely inaccurate and even bizarre from a human point of view.
And they appear to undermine claims of human–machine simi-
larity, suggesting “an astonishing difference in the information
processing of humans and machines” (p. 1 in ref. 35) or “a dis-
connect between human and computer vision” (p. 1 in ref. 58),
and showing how “deep learning systems do not construct
human-like intermediate representations” (p. 35 in ref. 59).
But must these failures have such bleak implications? Themere
observation that two systems behave differently—even giving
extremely divergent responses to the same stimuli—needn’t by
itself refute more general claims of shared capacities and repre-
sentations. After all, two people may give radically different re-
sponses to a stimulus without a correspondingly radical difference
in the architecture of their brains: The same insect can inspire fear
in one person and fascination in another; the same math puzzle
can frustrate one person and captivate another; the same dress
can even appear black and blue to one person and white and gold
to another (60). If none of those differences entails a fundamental
cognitive or neural disparity, what should we conclude from
human–machine differences?
How to Compare Minds: Insights from Development
Within the study of intelligent systems, one research area has a
special expertise at comparing the capacities of different minds.
Developmental psychology—along with its neighbor, compara-
tive psychology—frequently explores problems rather like the
human–machine comparisons we are considering here. For example,
they may ask how similar the mind of an infant is to that of a mature
adult; how a healthy mind differs from a disordered one; or how a
human mind compares to the mind of a chimpanzee, crow, or oc-
topus. In doing so, these fields have established methodological and
conceptual tools for ensuring fair comparisons between intelligences.
One tool in particular has been essential to such comparisons, but
almost never appears in the scientific literature comparing humans
and machines (refs. 26, 36–38, 41, 45, and 61–64; cf. refs. 27 and 65):
distinguishing performance from competence.
Internal Knowledge vs. External Expression. Cognitive science
traditionally distinguishes what a system knows (competence)
from what it does (performance). Competence is a system’s un-
derlying knowledge: the internal rules and states that ultimately
explain a given capacity, often in idealized terms. Performance, by
contrast, is the application or use of such competences: how the
system actually behaves when prompted to express its knowledge.
The insight motivating this distinction is that intelligent crea-
tures often know more than their behavior may indicate, because
of “performance constraints” that get in the way. Consider some
examples from linguistics, where the performance/competence
distinction was introduced by Chomsky (39). Even native English
speakers occasionally misspeak (e.g., accidently saying “I swim-
med yesterday”) or stumble over long, complex sentences—as
when we easily process “The dog barked” or “The dog who bit
the cat barked” but perhaps struggle with “Sherry yelped when
the dog who bit the cat that Jay’s son Ross fed barked.”Why? The
reason for these errors is not that we don’t know how to conjugate
“swim” or don’t understand how phrasal structure works; rather,
it’s that humans are subject to performance constraints that are
distinct from their underlying linguistic capacities, such as limited
working memory or attention. If there’s not enough room in one’s
head to juggle all the linguistic balls that long or convoluted sen-
tences present, then one won’t easily process those sentences—
but only because of practical (even superficial) constraints on
memory. So even if human listeners could understand arbitrarily
long sentences in principle—i.e., even if their linguistic knowl-
edge per se wouldn’t prevent such understanding—they may not
do so in practice because of other limitations. (By contrast, other
failures really do reflect missing knowledge: When monolingual
English speakers don’t understand sentences spoken in Mandarin,
they not only fail to behave like Mandarin speakers but also lack
the relevant linguistic knowledge.)
Accommodating Performance Constraints
The performance/competence distinction is more than a theo-
retical insight: It has directly motivated new empirical research
that has revolutionized our understanding of what various crea-
tures know. And it can assist here too, by enriching human–
machine comparisons and making them more interpretable. The
next section outlines three “guidelines” for doing so; but first, it is
worth seeing how concretely such insights have assisted else-
where, by radically reinterpreting—or actively confirming—
apparent differences between adult humans and other minds.
When Superficial Differences Hide Deep Similarities. A central
question in developmental psychology concerns the origins of
human knowledge: how much of what we know as sophisticated
adults is rooted in capacities present in infancy, vs. how much
comes from culture, instruction, and experience. For example,
adults have the capacity for physical understanding: We know that
unsupported objects fall, that solid objects cannot pass through
one another, and that most things continue to exist even when out
of view. Do infants share this knowledge?
Observe infants’ natural behavior and you would be tempted
to conclude not. After all, babies drop their favorite toys without
appearing to worry what gravity will do to them, and they seem
genuinely surprised by games like “peek-a-boo,” in which adults
cover their faces as if disappearing. These behaviors almost re-
semble the embarrassing machine failures reviewed earlier, in that
it is hard to imagine a mature adult behaving in these strange
ways. But does this mean infants don’t know that unsupported
objects fall? Perhaps not; perhaps infants drop their toys simply
because they have poor motor control—a mere performance
constraint that needn’t imply a missing competence.
For this reason, psychologists who study infant cognition ac-
tively accommodate such constraints—e.g., by measuring infants’
understanding in ways that don’t require fine motor control. And
indeed, when infants are instead shown “puppet shows” in which
objects either rest stably on a surface or magically float while
unsupported, infants stare measurably longer at unsupported
floating objects, as if surprised by a violation of their expectations
(66). In other words, infants knew about gravity all along; they just
Firestone PNAS Latest Articles | 3 of 10
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failed to display that knowledge in their natural behavior, because
of other limitations on their performance.
When Superficial Differences Are Deep Ones Too. Distinguishing
performance from competence can also “confirm” differences be-
tween minds. For example, another enduring question is whether
other animals share humans’ capacity for language. Human children
begin speaking English after prolonged exposure to English speech;
but chimpanzees raised near English-speaking humans do not. Does
this mean chimpanzees cannot learn language? Again, perhaps not;
perhaps chimpanzees just have the wrong vocal tract for English
phonemes, but do have the underlying linguistic capacity.
To accommodate such limitations, an ambitious project
attempted to teach a chimpanzee American Sign Language (ASL)
instead of a spoken language (67). This chimpanzee—affection-
ately named “Nim Chimpsky”—was raised by human parents,
lived with human children, and was instructed in ASL like a young
human signer. However, despite learning some vocabulary words
and short phrases, Nim completely failed to master ASL: His vo-
cabulary was far smaller than experience-matched human peers, and
more centrally he failed to acquire ASL’s syntax—the rules for em-
bedding and modification that allow competent signers to build rich
clauses with generative power. So here an apparent difference was
confirmed: Since accommodating performance constraints still failed
to produce humanlike behavior, we might feel safer concluding that
chimpanzees lack the competence for language.
Fair Comparisons. These examples illustrate what may be called
species-fair comparisons between minds (68). A creature may well
“know what we know” and yet still fail to “do what we do” when
placed in similar circumstances. And though the precise theoretical
status of the performance/competence distinction is a subject of
ongoing debate, its utility in the above cases is clear: Allowing other
minds to demonstrate their knowledge requires accommodating their
performance constraints, so that their success or failure won’t depend
on those constraints. Indeed, such insights have been so indispensable
for comparing humans to other creatures that we should import them
into comparisons between humans and machines.
A Performance/Competence Distinction for Machines
Like infants and chimpanzees, machine-learning systems are se-
rious candidates for sharing at least some of our cognitive
capacities. But also like infants and chimpanzees, human and
machine performance is distinguishable from their underlying
competence (27). A familiar way this distinction can arise is when
humans and machines perform similarly but for different under-
lying reasons—as in longstanding critiques of accuracy bench-
marks as bases for comparison. But a less familiar way this
distinction can arise is when humans and machines perform dif-
ferently despite similar underlying competences, as a result of
differing performance constraints. Biological and artificial systems
are constrained in different ways: They operate on hardware of
differing speed and capacity, have different modes of issuing
behavioral responses, and even accept sensory input differently in
the first place. For example, human vision is sharp and colored at
the fovea but blurry and nearly colorblind in the periphery,
whereas machine-vision systems process digital images that may
be uniformly resolved. And so humans andmachines that view the
“same” photograph of a scene (or hear the same speech sample,
or touch the same object) may process “different” internal im-
ages, because of different constraints on receiving input. Con-
versely, machines are often constrained to a pool of limited
response options (e.g., choosing among ImageNet labels),
whereas humans typically have more freedom in their classifica-
tion decisions. These and other differing constraints could cause
humans and machines to perform differently even if their internal
competences were similar. How should we accommodate them?
Species-Fair Human–Machine Comparisons: Three Factors.
The rest of this discussion explores three factors contributing to the
species-fairness of human–machine comparisons. Importantly, each
factor discussed below is empirically anchored, having been
extracted from a concrete “case study” of how adopting it led re-
searchers to reinterpret human–machine behavioral differences
(primarily in machine vision). Although most of these cases recast
human–machine differences into similarities (as with infants’ physi-
cal knowledge), I conclude by discussing a challenge problem that
has eluded certain machine-learning architectures in ways that
don’t reflect mere performance constraints (as with chimpanzees’
failed language acquisition). When a difference remains even after
suitably fair comparisons, this suggests even more strongly that the
difference is deep and meaningful after all.
1. Limit Machines Like Humans
Could human performance constraints account for differences in hu-
man and machine behavior? One way to find out—our first factor of
three—is to actively burden machines with human limitations and ask
if the relevant behavioral differences attenuate or even disappear.
How This Has Helped: A Case Study. Researchers exercised by
adversarial examples often highlight how the tiniest perturbations
can alter machine classifications: Even “small and almost imper-
ceptible” changes (p. 1 in ref. 35) that are “invisible to the human
eye” (64) can cause woeful misclassifications, which is interpreted as
“an astonishing difference in the information processing of humans
and machines” (p. 1 in ref. 35). However, as just noted, the image
details a machine can process are limited only by the resolution of
the digital file it takes as input—whereas humans view such images
on physical displays that may not preserve the perturbation‡, using
Fig. 2. Intelligent systemsmay fail to express their knowledge in tests
that don’t accommodate their particular performance constraints.
Image credit: Victoria Dimitrova (artist); inspired by Hans Traxler.
‡Indeed, some adversarial perturbations are too small to flip a single bit on an
8-bit-color display (e.g., a VGA-connected monitor or projector), leaving them
completely physically absent when viewed on such displays.
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limited-acuity sensors (their eyes) that distort the images further.
In that case, being invisible to the human eye might be a reason
not to infer an astonishing difference in “information processing”
after all. (When one is interested in information processing, one is
surely interested in processing done by the mind, not the eye.)
Indeed, for all we know, humans too could detect the regularities
captured by some of these perturbations (69), if only we were
permitted to see them.
One recent study tested this possibility directly. To explore
how optical or physiological limitations contribute to divergent
responses to certain classes of adversarial images, Elsayed et al.
(70) asked what would happen if an adversarial attack had to fool
machine-vision systems that viewed images through a humanlike
“eye” (with a standard architecture thereafter). In other words,
instead of fooling standard convolutional neural networks (CNNs)
such as AlexNet or GoogLeNet, these researchers required the
adversarial perturbation to retain its fooling powers even after
passing through a model of the retina. Can such attacks still suc-
ceed? And what do they look like?
The remarkable answer is that such attacks fool human vision too.
For example, to alter a cat image so that multiple retinally con-
strained CNNs call it a dog, the required perturbation ends up adding
features that look doglike tomachines and humans (Fig. 3A)—so much
so that humans classify it as a dog under brief exposures. Similar
results arise for adversarial perturbations confined to small but high-
contrast (and so highly visible) patches (such as a daisy-to-jaguar
image that acquires a jaguar-like patch in its corner) (54) or when
an attack must fool many different machine-recognition systems in
real-world settings—as with a 3D “turtle”model that is misclassified
as a “jigsaw puzzle” after acquiring a puzzle-like texture on its
shell (53, 71). Intriguingly, this suggests that the more general the
attack (e.g., fooling many systems in many conditions), the more
sensitive humans may be to its result.
Importantly, what happened in this case study was not that a
machine behaved in more humanlike ways because human be-
haviors were “programmed into it”; that would be less interesting.
Rather, placing a superficial limitation on a peripheral processing
stage attenuated a difference previously attributed to more cen-
tral processes. Of course, this needn’t mean that all human in-
sensitivity to adversarial attacks will be explained in this way (72),
but rather that approaches like this can reveal which behavioral
differences have more superficial explanations and which have
deeper origins. And although Elsayed et al. (70) do not use the
language of performance and competence, their work perfectly
embodies that insight—namely, that fair comparisons must equate
constraints.
How It Could Help. Might other behavioral differences be illu-
minated by human performance constraints? It is easy to imagine
so. For example, many machine-vision systems are intolerant to
image distortions: If CNNs are trained on clean images but tested
on noisy images, they perform far below humans at test (73). But
here too, if machines were burdened with humanlike visual acuity
and so could barely represent the high-frequency features in the
training set (i.e., the features most distorted by this sort of noise),
they may be less sensitive to the patterns that later mislead them
(74). Indeed, recent work finds that giving CNNs a humanlike fovea
(75) or a hidden layer simulating V1 (76) improves robustness to
distortions and other perturbations (including adversarial examples).
Imposing humanlike limitations could also apply beyond vi-
sion. For example, systems trained through deep reinforcement
learning now defeat the best human players not only at Chess and
Go but also more complex and dynamic videogames. In doing so,
machines often use strategies that human experts find unhu-
manlike and “almost nonsensical” (77). However, machine players
often have abilities and knowledge that humans couldn’t have,
including a constant complete map view, machine-level calcula-
tion speed, and superhuman response times—all of which could
contribute to strange-seeming gameplay. Indeed, it has been
suggested that a “level playing field” equating such constraints
could produce more humanlike strategies (78).
2. Limit Humans Like Machines
Humans face limitations that machines do not, but machines also
face limitations that humans do not. For example, machine-vision
systems are typically “passive” learners that cannot explore
their environment, acquire new data, or compose new re-
sponses. Could such constraints explain any human–machine
behavioral differences? One way to find out could be to grant
curiosity-like abilities to machines and ask whether they behave
more humanlike; but of course this is a major engineering chal-
lenge (79). A different approach—and one whose technology is
more easily available—is to place machine-like constraints on hu-
mans and ask whether they come to behave like machines.
How This Has Helped: A Case Study.Machine-vision systems are
often trained on curated datasets of labeled images, such as
MNIST, CIFAR10, or ImageNet, which arose from challenge
crossword puzzle
bagel
starfish
school bus
crossword puzzle
bagel
starfish
school bus
crossword puzzle
bagel
starfish
school bus
What are these images?
(make your selection using only the options below)
B
adversarial 
perturbation
A
Fig. 3. (A) Most adversarial perturbations are too small for humans to
see. But when a cat is perturbed to appear like a dog to a CNN with a
prepended “retina,” the image acquires features that appear doglike
to humans, too. (B) Machines label these odd patterns as familiar
objects. But if you had to choose from a limited set of labels, what
would you pick? Under such constraints, humans become more likely
to agree with machine (mis)classifications.
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problems in computer vision. Although such datasets are very rich,
a consequence of such training regimes is that the machine’s
resulting “vocabulary” is typically limited to those labels in the
dataset—often an extremely eclectic array of specific terms such as
“crossword puzzle,” “chihuahua,” “school bus,” or “meatloaf.”
Every image a system like AlexNet (42) sees can receive only labels
from this set; but this constraint doesn’t exist for humans, who can
describe images however they like. So, even if machines trained on
such datasets could (internally) “see” images in humanlike ways,
they may nevertheless give (externally) unhumanlike classifications
if their output is constrained in ways that humans are not.
One study asked whether such constraints might contribute to
human–machine differences on peculiar “noise” images (52),
which seem meaningless to humans but are confidently recog-
nized as familiar objects by ImageNet-trained CNNs (e.g., Fig.
3B’s crossword puzzle). These images have been described as
“totally unrecognizable to human eyes” (52); and indeed, this
behavior (initially) seems completely unreplicable in humans. For
example, you might describe this image as “some vertical bars
with black, white, and gray segments, atop a swirling black and
white background”—but certainly not a crossword puzzle. How-
ever, AlexNet isn’t even permitted to answer that way; it can only
decide which label fits best.
To explore the role of such constraints, Zhou and Firestone (80)
asked humans to classify such noise images, but with the machine-
like constraint of choosing from labels available to the relevant
CNNs. For example, humans saw the crossword-puzzle image,
and beneath it appeared the label “crossword puzzle” alongside
one or more ImageNet labels randomly drawn from the imageset
[“school bus,” “bagel,” “starfish,” etc. (cf. ref. 81)]. Intriguingly,
humans in these conditions tended to choose labels that agreed
with CNN classifications better than would be expected by
chance—just as you might when looking at Fig. 3B. Indeed, like
AlexNet, you might even be “confident” in your selection of
crossword puzzle; not confident that the image really is a cross-
word puzzle, but rather confident that crossword puzzle is the best
label given the options, which is roughly what AlexNet does in
choosing it too (i.e., in making a softmax decision over activations
for each label). In that case, strange machine classifications of at
least some of these images are perhaps not so odd after all: Since
themachines aren’t permitted to invent or compose new labels (or
say “looks like a crossword puzzle but isn’t one”), the best they
can do is compute a similarity judgment and output a label better
than any other—just as humans might under similar constraints.
How It Could Help. Placing machine-like constraints on humans
might illuminate other behavioral differences. For example, CNNs
have purely feedforward architectures; in humans, this may better
map onto fast, early visual processes than slower, flexible cogni-
tive ones (82). In that case, additional machine-like constraints for
humans may be those that load more on vision than higher cog-
nition [e.g., brief image presentations (12, 70)], which may pro-
mote more “machine-like” answers (e.g., becoming more likely to
say “golf ball” in Fig. 1B). Related approaches could apply be-
yond vision, including auditory misclassification (83).
Similarly, image-classifying machines typically produce rank-
ordered lists of their favored labels, making such responses richer
than the single labels humans are usually asked for (56). But hu-
mans could easily produce machine-like lists too. Indeed, since
machine-learning benchmarks often consider it a success if the
correct label is among the machine’s top few choices, one could
similarly ask if themachine’s label is among the human’s top choices,
even if their first-choice labels differ. Consider again the teapot/golf-
ball image, for which many CNNs answer “golf ball” but humans
answer “teapot”; how concerning is this discrepancy? If two people
examineMichelangelo’sDavid, onemight say “man”while the other
says “marble” without this implying a radical difference in their
vision—especially if one would have said the other’s first choice as
its second. Similarly, “golf ball” would presumably be high on
humans’ lists too. A fuller inventory of human responses might
thus reveal more similarity than was initially apparent.
3. Species-Specific Task Alignment
The previous factors “equate” constraints on humans and ma-
chines, to make their testing conditions more similar. But some-
times equating such factors is impossible or undesirable, and
instead it is better to “accommodate” constraints—even when
this means choosing different tasks for different creatures.
Consider an example from cross-species work in psychology.
Many studies ask how different organisms process reward, in-
cluding which reward-learning mechanisms are shared by ro-
dents, human children, and adults. But different organisms value
different stimuli, and so the rewards used in rodent studies (e.g.,
water, alcohol, or cocaine) differ from those used for children (e.g.,
colorful stickers or plush toys), which in turn differ from adult rewards
(e.g., monetary payments or course credit). Clearly, one should not
literally equate these details; using the same stimuli across these
species (e.g., dollars in humans and dollars in rodents) would surely
probe different processes. Does this apply to machines too?
How This Has Helped: A Case Study. It has recently been sug-
gested that human vision fundamentally differs from machine vi-
sion in that human vision is “atomic” in ways that machine vision is
not (84). When humans must classify images from only a small
cropped patch, they exhibit near-ceiling accuracy until some
critical patch size, after which they are near floor. For example,
humans can recognize an airplane from a patch showing its
cockpit and wheel; but any smaller patch causes accuracy to drop
steeply and discontinuously. By contrast, CNN performance on
the same images and patches simply decays gradually, without
any discrete inflection. This result led Ullman et al. (84) to con-
clude that human recognition differs from machine recognition in
a fundamental way: Humans rely on discrete features to classify
images (“atoms of recognition”), whereas CNNs do not.
However, these superficially similar human and machine tasks
might be more different than they seem. In particular, both hu-
mans and machines in the minimal-patch studies saw patches
selected for humans; the patches were derived from human psy-
chophysics experiments, and then those patches were shown to
humans and machines. What if, instead, machines chose their own
patches? Funke et al. (85) ran just this test, generating minimal
patches from a “machine psychophysics” experiment. When tested
on machine-selected patches, CNNs showed the same sharp
dropoff in accuracy. In other words, aligning tasks required different
stimuli: human-selected patches for humans and machine-selected
patches for machines. In this aligned setting, both showed atomic
recognition patterns (86).
Of course, the fact that different patches were needed in the
first place suggests some kind of human–machine difference—
i.e., a difference in the features that each system finds diagnostic.
But that difference seems relatively less significant—and more
likely to change—than the deeper claim that human recognition is
a fundamentally different kind of process than machine recogni-
tion. After all, a child’s preference for stickers over money differs
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from an adult’s preference for money over stickers; but this isn’t a
particularly central difference, especially compared to the more
foundational process of learning the rewards that those stimuli
represent. Similarly here then: Even if a human and a machine
prioritize different features, the processing they do over those
features may share an atomic signature.
How It Could Help. Could failed alignment explain other human–
machine behavioral differences? A growing literature asks whether
machine-recognition systems see humanlike visual illusions; but
the results are mixed, with CNNs showing some illusions but
not others (87). While this could imply deep architectural dif-
ferences, another possibility concerns alignment: As Ward (87)
notes, machines might “misunderstand” their task (e.g., which
features should be reported), as even humans sometimes do
(88). More generally, object classification alone may not lead a
system to share our “perceptual goals” (although other training
regimes might).
Related work has explored CNNs’ apparent lack of a shape
bias. If an object has the texture of an elephant but the shape of a
cat (Fig. 1B), humans classify it as a cat with elephant skin; but
most CNNs behave oppositely, answering “elephant.” These and
similar patterns have suggested “a crucial divergence between
artificial visual systems and biological visual processes” (p. 2 in ref.
56). However, perhaps CNNs would classify based on shape, but
their particular training environment never demanded it. To find
out, Geirhos et al. (55) used style transfer techniques to produce a
whole training set in which one object is rendered in the style of
another. This training set makes it impossible to classify on texture
alone, since the various category instances (e.g., the many “cat”
images in the set) share only their shapes, not their textures. Re-
markably, these conditions caused CNNs to acquire a shape bias
on cat/elephant-style images, calling such images cats instead
of elephants. Similarly, Hermann et al. (89) show that simply
augmenting training images with naturalistic noise (e.g., color
distortions or blur) produces a shape bias as well. In other words, it
wasn’t that CNNs couldn’t give shape-based classifications of
images; they just didn’t employ that humanlike strategy until their
environment invited it.
What Species-Fair Comparisons Look Like
The previous sections extracted three principles that have con-
cretely improved the informativeness of human–machine com-
parisons (Fig. 4). These principles have thus been implemented by
previous work; how could future work follow suit? Although one
might consider these principles “ingredients” in a “recipe” for fair
comparisons, it isn’t necessary—andmay not be possible—for any
one test to implement them all. Instead, the most fruitful way to
engage these principles may be to treat them like psychologists
already do: as tools for comparing intelligent systems. When
developmental psychologists wish to read deeply into adult–
infant behavioral differences, the field’s standards are such that
researchers must consider performance constraints in making
their case (whether by running more experiments to accommo-
date such constraints, or by arguing that the constraints don’t
relevantly differ). My suggestion is simply that human–machine
differences follow this standard. In other words, machines should
occupy the same conceptual role as chimpanzees, infants, neu-
rological patients, etc., when compared to healthy human adults.
Saliently, however, such factors are rarely considered by con-
temporary human–machine comparisons. For example, one in-
fluential approach, Brain-Score, proposes a scheme for evaluating
behavioral and neural similarity to humans; machines whose
outputs don’t match human benchmarks are scored as less “brain-
like” (45). Although such scoring systems are certainly valuable,
they rarely account for the practical obstacles that can prevent other
systems from behaving like humans. Indeed, a small human child
would almost certainly earn a low behavioral Brain-Score and thus
be evaluated as not very brain-like—despite having a real human
brain! So too for other frameworks, including the creative “Animal-
AI Olympics” (61) that proposes two “playgrounds” (a virtual one
and a real-life copy) in which to compare animal and machine
performance at finding food, manipulating objects, or avoiding
danger. This project aims to “keep the comparison to the animal
Species-fair human-machine comparisons
1 limit machineslike humans 2 limit humanslike machines 3 task alignment
crossword
bagel
school bus
crossword
bagel
school bus
Fig. 4. Principles of “species-fair” human-machine comparisons. 1) Placing humanlike constraints on machines, such as filtering visual input
through a humanlike “retina.” 2) Placing machine-like constraints on humans, such as limited response options or brief exposures. 3) Aligning
tasks in specific-specific ways: In this case study, natural images were distilled into “atomic”minimal pairs, such that a small patch is recognizable
(green) but a slightly different patch isn’t (red); although it initially seemed that this applied only to humans (Left), recent work shows that
optimizing patches for machine vision produces a similarly atomic pattern (Right). Future human–machine comparisons may incorporate one or
more of these accommodations.
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case as close as possible”; but differential success will be hard to
interpret without explicitly considering performance constraints. This
isn’t to say that such frameworks aren’t useful—they certainly are
(especially concerning patterns of errors) (90)—but rather that failing
to separate performance from competence may produce misleading
results that could be avoided by accommodating such constraints.
Species-Fair Comparisons with Differences?
Considering performance constraints can also confirm differences
between systems, as shown by the case of chimpanzees’ failed
language acquisition. Are there any such examples for machines?
A Case Study: Same vs. Different. Consider Fig. 5A. After
training on natural images (e.g., bubbles and balloons), CNNs can
classify new instances with high accuracy, generalizing over views,
lighting, and other factors. What about Fig. 5B? These images are
from the Synthetic Visual Reasoning Test (SVRT) (91), which pre-
sents abstract relations such as “inside vs. outside,” “same vs. dif-
ferent,” “rotated vs. mirrored,” etc. Such relations are easily learned
by humans; for example, the test image in Fig. 5B clearly involves
two shapes being the “same.” What about machines?
Recent work shows that CNNs are surprisingly stumped by
such problems; in particular, by same/different relations. Kim et al.
(92) trained nine different CNNs on SVRT problems; although the
networks easily solved many of them (e.g., whether two objects
are touching, or whether one object is enclosed by another), all
models were at or near chance for same/different judgments—
despite this being trivial for humans. Kim et al. (p. 10 in ref. 92)
suggest that this “demonstrates feedforward neural networks’
fundamental inability to efficiently and robustly learn visual rela-
tions”, marking a “key dissimilarity between current deep network
models and various aspects of visual cognition.”
How far should we read into this result? Does it truly reflect a
deep difference (rather than a superficial one)? The factors we
have considered give us the tools to say yes. First, this differential
success doesn’t seem attributable to human performance con-
straints; after all, people do better here than CNNs, such that
adding human limitations seems unhelpful. [Indeed, Kim et al. (92)
explicitly rule out acuity as an explanation.] Second, there can be
no concern about output constraints as with misclassified “noise”
images (where machines, but not humans, have limited labels);
here, there are only two labels (same/different), and they are the
same labels for humans and machines. Finally, species-specific
(mis)alignment seems not to blame; the task and images are so
straightforward, and they were not tailored to humans in any ev-
ident way. Indeed, other creatures (including ducklings, pigeons,
and insects) can complete similar same–different tasks (93); ap-
parently, then, there is “cross-species” transfer. Yet, for one same/
different problem where humans require six instances, “the best
performing CNN model for this problem could not get significantly
above chance from 1 million training examples” (p. 10 in ref. 92).
These CNN architectures are thus like Nim Chimpsky, who
failed to acquire language despite care to exclude more superfi-
cial explanations. So just as that species-fair comparison licenses
more confidence about how humans differ from other primates,
this example should license similar conclusions about humans and
these machine-learning implementations. And although it is
conceivable that some other test could reveal efficient same/
different abstraction in such architectures (just as Nim might one day
learn language by some even more accommodating test), the space
of superficial alternative explanations has narrowed considerably—
and the performance/competence distinction allows us to say so.§
What Species-Fair Comparisons Show
Machines are not people, and there remain many reasons to
doubt that today’s leading AI systems resemble our minds—in
terms of how they learn (94), what they can do (26), and even what
they are in the first place (36). Even for vision, many core functions
remain beyond the reach of the most advanced Deep Learning
systems (38, 95). But if ever such systems do achieve humanlike
perception and cognition, how will we know? I have suggested
that it will not be sufficient to ask if machines reproduce humanlike
behaviors—not only for the familiar reason that similar behaviors
can arise from different underlying processes (“performance
without competence”), but also for the less familiar reason that
different behaviors can arise from similar underlying processes
(“competence without performance”).
The Value of Behavior. Species-fair tests offer a distinct kind of
evidence from other human–machine comparisons. For example,
studying machine representations “neurophysiologically” [e.g.,
visualizing representations in intermediate layers (96)] might seem
to sidestep the performance/competence issue altogether. But
even these valuable approaches can be misled by performance
constraints—especially constraints on input. For example, visual-
ization techniques on adversarial images led to conclusions that
“human perception and DNN representations are clearly at odds
with one another” (p. 3 in ref. 97)—which, while literally true, may
not explain why such different representations arise in the first
place. Indeed, it is telling that much progress in understanding
such errors has come from “behavioral” studies (in humans and
machines) (69, 70, 74, 80). A mixed strategy is likely best, with
behavioral comparisons as essential components.
Other Developmental Lessons. Distinguishing performance
from competence is not the only insight that development can
A B
Fig. 5. (A) CNNs can classify natural images into hundreds of categories (e.g., bubble), generalizing over views, lighting, and other factors. (B) But
they struggle with basic abstract relations between objects (such as two objects being the “same”), even from extremely simple images.
§Indeed, Kim et al. (92) suggest that getting feedforward networks to succeed
efficiently requires fundamentally transforming them to implement Gestalt-like
principles of perceptual organization, in ways that highlight the absence of
segmented object representations in such networks. (See also ref. 85 for an
architectural solution involving [inefficient] brute-force methods.)
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offer. Others include avoiding machine anthropomorphization
(40) and even human “anthropofabulation” (98)—a bias to inflate
human intelligence in comparisons with other creatures. When we
scoff at the errors of animals or machines, we may react this way
because we imagine humans to be free of such errors. But in
doing so we may be imagining humans at our best—e.g., a skilled
actor in favorable conditions—and comparing such idealized
abilities to animals or machines in unfavorable conditions. Im-
portantly, such biases might lead to unfair comparisons that un-
derestimate machine capacities (65).
Conclusion
Artificial intelligence research is increasingly informed by cognitive
science and developmental psychology. The innate machinery
within humans, and the rich environments we encounter, are well
worth considering in the broader quest for humanlike machine
intelligence. But these fields offer more than data and hypotheses
about what makes humans smart; they also offer tools for identi-
fying and comparing intelligence in other creatures. One tool that
has been indispensable is to consider the performance constraints
that various creatures face. Human–machine comparisons demand
the same care.
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